Home           Contact us           FAQs           
   Journal Page   |   Aims & Scope   |   Author Guideline   |   Editorial Board   |   Search
2013 (Vol. 5, Issue: 05)
Article Information:

Buyback Contract Coordinating Supply Chain Incorporated Risk Aversion

Guangxing, Xin Deng, Yanhong Qin and Qing Wu
Corresponding Author:  Guangxing 

Key words:  Buyback contract, risk aversion, supply chain coordination, , , ,
Vol. 5 , (05): 1744-1749
Submitted Accepted Published
July 31, 2012 September 03, 2012 February 11, 2013

This research studies the buyback contract of a supply chain system composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. The buyback contract is divided into two cases, the credit for all unsold goods and the credit for a partial return of goods, which are theoretically analyzed and simulated numerically respectively. The results show that when the retailer is risk averse, the supply chain system is able to achieve coordination. The buyback price is an increasing function of and the buyback ratio is also an increasing function of, while the wholesale price is a decreasing function of the risk aversion.
Abstract PDF HTML
  Cite this Reference:
Guangxing, Xin Deng, Yanhong Qin and Qing Wu, 2013. Buyback Contract Coordinating Supply Chain Incorporated Risk Aversion.  Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology, 5(05): 1744-1749.
    Advertise with us
ISSN (Online):  2040-7467
ISSN (Print):   2040-7459
Submit Manuscript
   Current Information
   Sales & Services
   Contact Information
  Executive Managing Editor
  Email: admin@maxwellsci.com
  Publishing Editor
  Email: support@maxwellsci.com
  Account Manager
  Email: faisalm@maxwellsci.com
  Journal Editor
  Email: admin@maxwellsci.com
  Press Department
  Email: press@maxwellsci.com
Home  |  Contact us  |  About us  |  Privacy Policy
Copyright © 2009. MAXWELL Science Publication, a division of MAXWELLl Scientific Organization. All rights reserved