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Abstract
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Article Information:
Buyback Contract Coordinating Supply Chain Incorporated Risk Aversion
Guangxing, Xin Deng, Yanhong Qin and Qing Wu
Corresponding Author: Guangxing
Submitted: July 31, 2012
Accepted: September 03, 2012
Published: February 11, 2013 |
Abstract:
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This research studies the buyback contract of a supply chain system composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. The buyback contract is divided into two cases, the credit for all unsold goods and the credit for a partial return of goods, which are theoretically analyzed and simulated numerically respectively. The results show that when the retailer is risk averse, the supply chain system is able to achieve coordination. The buyback price is an increasing function of and the buyback ratio is also an increasing function of, while the wholesale price is a decreasing function of the risk aversion.
Key words: Buyback contract, risk aversion, supply chain coordination, , , ,
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Cite this Reference:
Guangxing, Xin Deng, Yanhong Qin and Qing Wu, . Buyback Contract Coordinating Supply Chain Incorporated Risk Aversion. Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology, (05): 1744-1749.
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ISSN (Online): 2040-7467
ISSN (Print): 2040-7459 |
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