

The Road Travelled By the Protective Services Division in the Jamaica Constabulary Force: Politics, Culture, Socialization and Division

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Abstract: Despite the importance of VIP services in the protection of human life owing to the likelihood of threat of physical harm, the role of outside influences on operations of this Division, the increasing crime problem and fear which emanated from the murder counts, a study had never been conducted on the past, present, challenges, modernization, stigmatization, victimization and the way forward for the division. The main objective of this paper is an examination of Protective Services Division (PSD) within best practices, guideline and the way forward. This study employed mixed qualitative methods: document analysis, ethnography, life history, narrative and thematic identification. There is clear evidence that in the past politics have influenced the appointment, functional and employees of PSD. PSD has seen significant modernization, especially since October 2011. The Division now has a general blueprint that provides operational directives and code of conduct for agents. Despite the modernization and transformation of the Division moreso since October 2011, there are inadequacies in equipment and machinery and the non-standardization of equipment. The evolution and revolution of PSD cannot cease with the current modernization and transformation as those are a part of the way forward and not an end. There is still more work to be done before PSD can be compared international agencies of its type. The process has afforded a Division that is now eyed by other police officers and this desire is outside of political favouritism, promotional opportunities and the power structure.

Keywords: Agents, intelligence, Jamaica, organizational culture, police, political interference, political manoeuvrings, political police, politics and policing, protective services division, threat analysis

INTRODUCTION

Many of the challenges in a society have wider implications such as crime and violence, unemployment, corruption, mistrust (interpersonal and government), low confidence in socio-political institutions, fear of crime and victimization, social exclusion and policing. In 2007, using stratified probability sample of 1,338 Jamaicans, a group of academic researchers found that:

- 11 out of every 25 respondents indicated that crime and violence were the leading national problem
- 7 out of every 100 people trusted government
- 7 out of 50 individuals trusted other people
- 15 out of every 50 mentioned that unemployment was the second leading national problem
- 2 out of every 25 indicated that they had confidence in the police
- 7 out of every 100 people indicated that they have confidence in political parties (Powell *et al.*, 2007)

The aforementioned socio-political issues highlight the demand, need and rationale for close protection

because of the fear of crime and victimization and the state of the social economy. The fear of crime and victimization is widespread in Jamaica as 2 out of every 5 persons indicated a high likelihood of being a victim of physical violence (Harriott, 2004), particularly in urban zones (de Albuquerque and McElroy, 1999). Within the context of the high fear of criminality and victimization, the low confidence in the (JCF), the JCF was established and continue to protect lives as well as properties.

The current crime problem in Jamaica can be traced to early nineteenth century in Kingston. The early settlers in Kingston were primarily poor and free slaves and while the establishment of dwellings therein were in response to the economics at the time, criminal activities were committed only by a small percentage of the populace (Simmonds, 2004). The pull factors to criminal activities were economic hardship, perceived betterment from the alternative investment schemes and the low probability of being incarcerated (Becker, 1968). The economic marginalization of the peasants, income maldistribution, social exclusions and economic progress of the bourgeoisie (planters) class during slavery provide a justification for social deviances (Besson, 1995;

Gordon, 1987; Stone, 1987; Beckford, 1972). Criminality being an economic phenomenon (Becker, 1968; Francis *et al.*, 2001) meant that those who are economically successful conceptualize a likelihood of being victimized because of the social inequality and inequality in the society, so they as well others who feared physical harm seek protection which prompted the establishment of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF).

Although the Jamaica Constabulary Force was established following the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865 (1867), its evolution dates back to 1655 (JCF, 1981). The British Colonists on capturing the island in 1655 carried with them a Parish Constable, which was the institution framework of a police services (JCF, 1981). Then in 1716, night watchmen (police officers) were allotted to supply policing services to Port Royal, Kingston, Saint Catherine and Saint Andrew. The Act of 1777 repealed the 1716 Act which saw the emergence of appointed petty constables (JCF, 1981). The constables had the legal authority "...to discharge offending constables for misbehaviour" (JCF, 1981).

Then in 1832, structures were created to institute a permanent police agency (force), which was headed by Inspector General William Ramsay. It was after the Morant Bay Rebellion, which highlighted the weaknesses in the police arrangement, that this saw the establishment of JCF (JCF, 1981). The JCF began operating with 984 members that were governed by an Inspector General who was appointed by the British Governor of Jamaica, with a mandate to protect life, property and policing duties. But it was an Act of 1867 that gave rise to a police force named 'The Jamaica Constabulary Force' (JCF, 1981). The Jamaica Constabulary Force was given the authority to have a 'Central Training Depot' that was responsible for recruitment and staff training.

The hierarchical structure of the contemporary JCF dates back to its origin and refashioned in 1960. In 1960, the JCF was organized around four commands- Headquarters, CID, Traffic and Number 4 Police Area, in which commands were top-down from commissioner to junior staffers through Assistant Commissioners (ACP), Senior Superintendent (SSP), Superintendents (SP), Deputy (or assistant) superintendents (DSP), inspectors and down the change of command. Assistant Commissioners were responsible for different Divisions in which would include various branches, units and sections. Crimes in Jamaica were supervised by an ACP who was responsible for CIB, Special Intelligence Branch and SIB. The crime phenomenon has change significantly between the 1960 and 2010, which is embodied in the statistics on violent crimes, especially murders that account for a demand and need to establish a Protective Services Branch.

During the 1970s in Jamaica, murders were less than 500 annually until the turn of the 1980s, when for the first

time in the nation's history that this reached 889 (Table 1). The 1970s was a period in Jamaica when the then PNP administration under the leader of the former Prime Minister Michael Manley experimented with socialism (Bernal, 1986). The period of the 1970s in Jamaica, under Michael Manley's regime' ushered an emergence of social programmes geared toward uplifting the working class which was different from the industrial plantation, capitalism (or market economy) (Bernal, 1986). There was a restructuring of the Jamaican economy during the 1970s and many of the socioeconomic disparities were been corrected with democratic socialism, which the (API, 1986; Bernal, 1986) referred to as basic contradictions.

The general elections of 1980 was a conflict of sort over political ideology between socialism and capitalism and this heightened the violence and murders as the two political parties [the People's National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP)] were a divide of the people. The violent crimes and the murders statistics embodied the tension, political divide, ideology conflict and how socialistic and capitalistic ideology found for the leadership of the nation (Table 1) - (PIOJ, 1979-2011). Political identity had divided the nation, people chose a side and this was to determine how attitude and behaviour was formed. Many of the murders were based on the premise of political values and attitude as one side of the debate was the other as traitor and the national identity was reduced to political values. The political rivalry was intense, people of different political values had fundamental problems with his neighbour on political ideology and threat alert grew for heads of the two political parties at the time (two former Prime ministers- Michael Manley and Edward Seaga). Professor Munroe (2002) extensively explained how political culture drives political behaviour, which would account for the action (or inactions) of people during the 1970s leading up to the 1980 general elections in Jamaica.

The police were called upon to close protect the then Prime Minister of Jamaica and the leader of the Jamaica Labour Party and the nation had emerged out of a political ideological war, which is spoken through the violent crimes statistics, particularly murder in the 1980 compared to the 1970s as well as post-1980 (Table 1) - (PIOJ, 1979-2011). Another rationale for the exponential increase in violent crimes, especially murders in the 1980 can be accounted for by armed criminal gangs that began operating at the start of the 1970s. Then at the end of the decade of the 1980 s, murders had increased by 85.3% compared to the decade of the 1970s. The decade of the 1990s saw a 54.6% increase in murder over the 1980s and at the end of decade of 2000, murders grew by 76.4% compared to the previous decade (Table 1). And the 1970s and 1980s pale in significance to the number of murders in 2000 and although Gray postulated that "...the period

Table 1: Number of murders and violent crime, 1970-2010

Year	Murder	Violent crime	Year	Murder	Violent crime
1970	152		1990	542	20698
1971	145		1991	561	18522
1972	170		1992	629	20173
1973	227		1993	653	21275
1974	195		1994	690	22403
1975	266		1995	780	23083
1976	367		1996	925	24617
1977	409	15893	1997	1037	22053
1978	381	16640	1998	953	19781
1979	351		1999	849	17056
1980	889	24201	2000	887	16469
1981	490		2001	11911	4929
1982	405	19867	2002	1045	14047
1983	424		2003	975	13611
1984	484	21186	2004	1471	15306
1985	-		2005	1674	14920
1986	449	19228	2006	1340	13136
1987	442		2007	1574	14219
1988	414	19456	2008	1601	11432
1989	439	19886	2009	1680	11939
			2010	1428	11062

PIOJ (1979-2011)

of the 1970s, a time of great upheaval, political violence and social polarization in Jamaica” (Gray, 2003), the demands for close protection by the police have geometrically grown as more people express a feeling of fear of physical harm.

Statistics revealed that the 1980s marks a transition in wanton murders, although its genesis began in the 1970s. Obika Gray opined that 1) “...unforgiving ghetto during the party civil wars in the 1970s” (Gray, 2003) “This study focuses on the period of the 1970s, a time of great upheaval, political violence and social polarization in Jamaica” Gray, 2003) “Activists during the 1970s reported that Barth [criminal] was familiar with former CIA agent Philip Agee’s critique of U.S. imperialism...” (Gray, 2003) Indeed, by the late 1970s urban gangster for both the political and criminal underworlds were becoming a growing source of patronage with which politicians had to compete” (Gray, 2003). Those issues highlighted the emergence of criminality, the informal industry which existence because of the failure of the formal economy to adequately provide for the needs of the people and how much of these activities lead to violence and murders emanating from the 1970s. Harriott postulated that “Between 1977 and 2000, the rate of violent crime has increased from 254.6 incidents per 100,000 citizens to 633.4/100,000 and the murder rate from 19.2/100,000 to 39/100,000” (Harriott, 2003) and this is further detailed on in Table 1.

Gray (2003) extensively examined the political environment of Jamaica during the 1970s, outlined the inter-correlation between gangs, violence and politics and how underground criminal activities gave impetus to the violent crimes, particularly murders. The 1980 s was the beginning of the spiralling murder problem in Jamaica, which had its genesis in the political ideological divide of

the 1970s, which are embedded in the major crimes statistics, especially murders. Increasingly, the police are called upon address crime problems and deviant acts in the society which emerged in Hearne Commission Report in 1947 (May 16). According to Sives “...and the importance of the police presence was highlighted in the inquiry” and further that “On 5 July it was clear that the presence of police between two well-supported political meetings had averted clashes which, according to the police evidence, both sides were well prepared for” (Sives, 2003).

The political ideological war which intensified in the late 1970s into 1980 had some similarities to the late 1940s. Amanda Sives outlined this, when she opined that:

By 1949 both political parties were engaged in violence to achieve political goals: the JLP to keep the PNP off the streets of Kingston and the PNP to force their way back, to campaign for their party and their union movement (Sives, 2003)

It can be extrapolated from Sives’ postulation that some of the murders in 1940s were political related, ideological values were different and political differences were sometimes settled in bloodshed. Using statistics, from 1970s, the progression of violence and murders heightened in the late 1970s to early 1980 had their genesis from political environment because of partisan political structure of the 1940s. Amanda Sives, however, dates this to the 1960s (Sives, 2003), but the Hearne’s Report justifies an early beginning. Sives aptly captures the aforementioned reality when she opined that ‘modern political violence’ pre-dates independence (Sives, 2003) and that this has always demanded police intervention and efforts. Figueroa and Sives comment that “The government’s decision, following the 1993 election, to appoint a new police commissioner from outside the force had a very positive effect on the public’s image of the police” (Figueroa and Sives, 2003), indicating how the police are brought into the discourse of crime control and the socio-political environment can result new trial measures to address the crime problem, including appointment of commissioners and the establishment of units (or divisions).

Undoubtedly the political and social milieu dictated special training of police officers to meet the need for close protection of Ministers of government, political representative and high risk members of the society as the fear of victimization had increased significantly since the late 1970s. Special Branch was mandated with the operational responsibility of providing trained operatives (bodyguards) for the protection of the aforementioned cohorts in the society (JCF, 2005). Gradually, Special Branch was relieved of VIP and conference security and on September 1, 1979 Protective Services Division was instituted for providing protection of Ministers of Government, Heads of States, government personalities,

Jamaicans and some political representatives (JCF, 2010). Special Branch having been relieved of VIP services was, therefore, left to concentrate on intelligence gathering (JCF, 2005). This meant that police officers had to be trained in keeping with this focus, which began as early as the 1990s (U.S Department of States, 2009) and this has continued since that time (U.S Department of States, 2009). Such an activity is not limited to Jamaica as the training included other participants outside of the Caribbean and a training manual that provides a guideline for protective services (U.S Department of States, 2009).

The seriousness of the crime problem in the Caribbean, particularly Jamaica, meant that peoples' fear of crime and victimization had reached an alarming level that they were now willing to circumvent the time that the police would take to solve the cases and the justice system would pronounce guilt on the criminals. This was reported by Harriott (2003), when he says that "There, in response to a series of incidents of violent crime, citizens mobilized themselves as vigilante groups and rioted and attacked a police station in an effort to "lynch" three men whom they erroneously thought were criminals and who had sought refuge in the police station" (Harriott, 2003). Clearly people had now perceived the police to be irresponsive to the crime problem and this was even found in another study. In Levy's research, he postulates that "Wetty said that the police don't respond to domestic violence. You have to die first before the police come. She once had to walk for five days, back and forth, to get justice after her daughter was beaten with bricks she was bruised and swollen (Levy, 1996). This highlights people's low level of confidence in police to execute their seeming duties.

A national cross-sectional probability survey conducted by Powell *et al.* (2007) found that 4 out of every 50 Jamaica had confidence in the police force. When the respondents were asked 'How would you evaluate the work of the police in preventing crime in your community?' 4.3% said very good; 65.5% remarked, "fairly good" and 6.7% reported 'bad'. This must be understood with the context of people's perception of the 'war against crime' which is the new social monster. In Powell, Bourne and Waller's work, they found that 12.6% of Jamaicans indicated that the 'The war against crime and delinquency in Jamaica is being won' (Powell *et al.*, 2007) and 44% said that crime and violence was the most pressing problem (Powell *et al.*, 2007). The police are the ones, who are sought to address social and political conflicts, mistrust that lead to conflicts and this is a hallmark of the institution's formation (JCF, 1981)

Within the context of fear of victimization and physical violence and knowing the involvement of police in criminal activities (Robotham, 2003; Levy, 1996), the shifting of police officers from the Protective Services Division is in keeping with the trust (or distrust) of those that are in or outside the unit by the political directorates.

In other jurisdictions such as Ireland, United States and Great Britain, Protective Services (or Special Branch) has a history which dates back to late 1800s or early 1900s. In Ireland, the Special Branch evolved in response to the threat against the Irish Republic by terrorists in 1883. Special Branch in Ireland was responsibility for the gathering and dissemination of intelligence to government agencies in order to counter likely terrorism threats.

The Protective Service which is carried out by the Secret Service Division in the United States began operation in 1865 to address counterfeit currency. Then in 1867, its portfolio was widened to include the responsibility of finding people whom were perpetrating frauds against the nation (United States Secret Service, 2011a, 2011b). It was in 1902 that the Secret Service was assigned the responsibility of close protecting the President and then this was broadened to include the President elect in 1908 (United States Secret Service, 2011a, 2011b).

The problem defined: The crime phenomenon in Jamaica, especially murders, continues to rise and this is made worst within the increasing threat brought on by terrorism, deportation and mistrust. The complexity of the crime problem in the Caribbean, particularly Jamaica, has created widespread fear of physical violence, victimization and need for security protection. Within the social context of crime and violence, the police force was established to address social conflicts. The 1970s-to-1980s mark a turning in the landscape of Jamaican political history which saw a need for close protection for the Prime Minister, Opposition leader, Former Prime Ministers and their spouses, some members of parliament and other Government Officials.

Prior to 1979, close protection was executed by Special Branch. This Division had the expertise and resources to train officers to meet the demands for VIP services. This meant that in addition to intelligence gathering, Special Branch was called upon to provide protection for VIPs, conference security and the vetting personnel to be trained as VIP agents. The heightened political divide in the late 1970s to early 1980 caused more attention to be placed on protective services, which saw the emergence of a division solely instituted to address VIP services. The Protective Services Division which became operational following the 1980 general election has gone through many metamorphoses since then.

Despite the importance of VIP services in the protection of human life owing to the likelihood of threat of physical harm, the role of outside influences on operations of this Division, the increasing crime problem and fear which emanated from the murder counts, a study had never been conducted on the past, present, challenges, modernization, stigmatization, victimization and the way for this division. The paucity of information on the matter of pivotal importance cannot go unresearched as VIP

protection must be treated as a science and not an afterthought to be executed by political operatives. It is this reality that forms the basis upon which a study on the PSD is timely and must be studied with urgency to provide guidelines for Division and the police force in general. The main objective of this study is an examination of PSD to provide best practices, guideline and the way forward.

Theoretical framework: The use of a theoretical framework is well documented in social science research, equally and widely used by Caribbean criminologists to examine the crime phenomenon, particularly an objectivist epistemology (Chadee, 2003; Ellis, 1992; Harriott, 2003, 2004). Michael Crotty forwarded a rationale for the use of a theoretical framework when he postulated that “The philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria” (Crotty, 2005). He further opined that “this is precisely what we do when we elaborate our theoretical perspective. Such an elaboration is a statement of the assumptions brought to the research task and reflected in the methodology as we understand and employ it” (Crotty, 2005). The theoretical perspective that is brought to bear on this work is constructionism, which is different from the usual objectivism.

The objectivist epistemology holds sacred logic, precision, general principles, principles of verification, the standard of rigor, gradual development, establishment of laws, principles, theories and apparatuses in “*search for truth*” and proofs (Balashov and Rosenberg, 2002). But like Max Weber forwarded, science is more than singly captured in objectivism. Hence, the rationale for the use of an interpretivism epistemology in difference between the current work and many Caribbean criminologists such as Harriott (2003, 2004), Ellis (1992), Chadee (2003) and others whom have used objectivism. Crotty (2005) once remarked:

“...we describe the philosophical stance that lies behind our chosen methodology. We attempt to explain how it provides a context for the process and grounds its logic and criteria... (and) this is precisely what we do when we elaborate our theoretical perspective”.

Such an elaboration is a statement of the assumptions brought to the research task and reflected in the methodology as we understand and employ it (Crotty, 2005). With the difficulty of finding a single theoretical framework (perspective, theory or model) that explains the underpinnings of this research, the researcher used a *hybrid* model. The two fundamental theories that provide a philosophical stance for this study are *hierarchical* and *power (command) theories* (Pattee, 1973; Ahl and Allen, 1996; Lupia, 2001). The hierarchical structure and power

driven nature of the JCF provides the platform for understanding how decisions are made, disseminated and acted upon by successive lower-level members. This denotes that subordinates are held accountable not for their innovation, intuition, wit, creativity, insight and vision; but how well they execute the command of their superiors within the hierarchical structure. Successive subordinates and in particular, street-level members are therefore expected to comply forthwith with directives. Any attempt to challenge or question directive is viewed as insubordination and may be subjected to disciplinary action.

It is within the purview of the hierarchical and power theories that give a context for the process and grounds that can be used to collect, interpret and carry out this research. Both theories are embodied in constructivism that is inherent in particular theoretical framework and provide a guide to a methodology and method of choice. Crotty outlines that constructivism (epistemology) is embedded in interpretivism (including phenomenology) that requires the use of ethnography and phenomenological methodologies and these are carried out by using interview, document analysis, conversation analysis and thematic identification. The *hybrid model* that fashion this research still draws on other theories, but that no single theory offers an overarching explanation of this work.

The current study aims to evaluate the Protective Service Division of the JCF, examine its historic development, function, transformation, modernization, political interference on the Division, promotion and stigmatization among other issues in order to provide a research platform for action, policy formulation and changes as these will give an understand of how the Division can chart the way forward.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptual framework: Like most of the Caribbean, the police force in Jamaica has its origin in the colonial era of plantation slavery with its primary responsibility dedicated to the preservation of the plantation architecture that was critical to the metropolis (Harriott, 2000). It is noted that one of the earlier legal mention of the office of the constable in Jamaica is documented in a letter from Charles II, which was written in 1671 (Milwood, 1991), the letter advised the provost marshal to “convene an assembly to govern the island ... (and that) it is the duty of citizens to volunteer for service in the office of constable” (ibid). This ‘service in the office of constable’ had its importance not to protect the general population but to keep the slaves in check in order to prevent loitering, revolts and other ‘*deviant behaviors*’ that were deemed inimical to the success of plantation slavery.

A pivotal juncture for policing in Jamaica is the period of the 1800s which was largely characterized by uprising led by Sam Sharpe and Paul Bogle in 1831 and 1865, respectively. With these riots came the formation of Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) in 1866. The JCF adopted the Irish Constabulary model of policing which was paramilitary in structure as it was felt that the British model was too gentlemanly civil to be effective in a context of violent uprising (Milwood, 1991; Harriott, 2000).

In spite of its paramilitary structure and practices, the JCF lacked the capacity to effectively address the myriads of social issues of the day. The response was to increase numbers of persons eligible to do the tasks when the needs arise. As a result, in 1904, The *Constables (Special) Act* was passed making provision for the appointment of Special Constables to assist the JCF when the need arises. Special Constables then were untrained and worked only part-time with a distinctive badge on the right arm bearing the words 'Special Constable'. During the 1938 civil disturbance, eligible civilians were recruited from every parish and sworn on as special constables giving rise to the formation of a *Company* of special constable in each parish.

The law provided that the powers, authorities, privileges, duties, etcetera of the Special Constable shall be similar to that of the JCF. This provision was later reinforced by an order of the Supreme Court and later, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Essentially, the framers of law did not reinvent the wheel in outlining a set of powers and duties for members of the ISCF. They simply state that such powers, authorities, privileges, duties etcetera shall be similar to those of the JCF. Of importance is the fact that the powers, authorities and duties of JCF members are not necessarily restricted to any single piece of legislation. Rather and with exception for some provisions in the Constabulary Force Act which outlines some powers in a general sense, a large portion of the powers and duties are conveniently placed in several pieces of different legislations depending on the intent of each.

Implementation in the Jamaican police force: In spite of the myriad of changes, Caribbean organizations and, in this instance, those in Jamaica, having been influenced by plantation slavery (Lindo, 1975), have lingering patterns of *power distance* relationship (Holstede, 1983) facilitating unequal treatment of segments of the society (Eyre, 1986; Stone, 1988; Headley, 1992). In *high power distance* societies, hierarchical structures are necessary not only for the purpose of delineation, but more so, there is an implied assumption that knowledge is clustered at the apex and to be imparted down the *distance*.

There are several forces that influence decision makers within Caribbean public sector to assume central roles or a hierarchical top-down approach in initiating, shaping and pursuing public policies (Esman, 1991; Grindle and Thomas, 1991). First, there is the prevailing literature and practice of the classical public administration of the nineteenth century which promoted the importance of state sovereignty. Public administration has its theoretical and normative principles in the works of John Stewart Mill entitled *Representative Government*, Woodrow Wilson's *Study of Administration* in 1887 and Max Weber's *Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft* (Lane, 1993). In this regard Esman notes that;

“[P]olicies are determined and enunciated at the political level of government; programs are shaped and refined by senior administrators. They are implemented through centralized bureaucratic hierarchies that enforce accountability upward from subordinate to senior officials... the public is on the receiving end of regulations and services designed by remote but politically responsible officials”.

Lane (1993) outlined a set of maxims that tend to construct a general public administration model; Tasks are decided by politicians and executed by administrators; Procedures are written, continuous and rule-bound; Rules are either technical or legal and require trained personnel; Tasks and functions are divided into functionally distinct spheres, each with the requisite authority and sanctions; Officers and tasks are arranged in a centralized hierarchical manner and Public resources are distinct from individual/private ones.

All contemporary Third World elites have adopted this model together with the derivation of administrative laws as supporting instruments (ibid). Over time, this hierarchical model reflects the *perspectives, preferences and conveniences* of the senior administrator (ibid).

The second but related factor not only explains the emergence of the bureaucratic hierarchical structure of Caribbean administration but also the set of unique circumstances within the policy environment that sustain such structure. Of significance are Grindle and Thomas (1991) generalization of the policy environment of developing countries and, by extension, the Caribbean's policy environment. They noted that the characteristics of uncertain information, poverty, pervasive state influence in the economy and centralization of decision-making resulting from colonial rule have caused decision makers to emerge as central actors. The existence of underdevelopment and limited capacity in the immediate post-independent era has given rise to a centrally command administrative structure (ibid, 51-52). The

transition from *underdeveloped* towards *developing* country has somewhat weakened but has in no way eliminated this structure or the general characteristics. The result is that the policy environment of Commonwealth states has been thwarted by defective institution building resulting in some cases to mere symbolism in place of real change (Jones, 1985) and policy paradox as in the case of the attempt to transform the Jamaican prisons to rehabilitation centres (Jones, 2007).

The issue of corruption features prominently within the discourse of Caribbean politics/policy environment. During the 1980s to early 1990s, there has been a plethora of dismissal, forced resignation or conviction of government ministers and leaders of security forces as a result of corruption. A major factor is that within small islands developing states there is scarcity of resources which generates excessive social demands. People have become adept at paying to cut red tape in order to “transform the distant public administrator into a friendly patron” (Jones, 1985). The ‘friendly patron’ is thus created in all aspects of the bureau-law enforcement, education, motor vehicle licences, customs, amongst others. One will always find it more convenient to bribe or ‘let off something’ in order to avoid waiting in the long queue in which, at the end, there is no certainty or consistency of outcome. The extent of corruption can be exacerbated by the bureaucrat whose activities are ostensibly concealed under the cloak of his inherent and excessive discretionary powers. Corrupt bureaucrat such as the police must be analysed within the context of a wider problem of governance which in turn is exacerbated by “lack of transparency” and proper “checks and balance”, “weak rule of law and fragile institution” (USAID, 2007).

Amidst the myriad of organizational changes, the police force in Jamaica maintains the hierarchical paramilitary structure with the concomitant command and control methods of management much similar to what obtains since its inception in 1866. This model of policing which is “perhaps more profoundly shaped by colonialism than any other institution” is top-down, has an operational culture of control as against service and problem-solving and emphasises the relationship between officers and other ranks (Harriott, 2000) thus outdoing the *power distance* arrangement of the wider society. But how has this ‘paramilitary’ style differs from for example, other forms? And what is unique about the nature of policing in the Jamaican context that has ensured the continuation of this structure?

The prefix ‘Para’ has its origin in Greek and essentially means ‘beside’. A paramilitary police force is one that is trained and operates along military lines and its mode of operation is “based on political values that favour

the primacy of order over freedom and justice” (Harriott, 2000). A paramilitary police may be contrasted to a civil police service that operates along civic arrangements. Harriott characterizes this paramilitary style of policing as:

“a complex of relationship; a mode of organization and control of its members typified by a high degree of centralization; a mode of interface with and control of the mass public typified by the targeting of threatening subpopulation (usually those at the bottom of the social hierarchy) and relatively indiscriminate (legally dubious and morally unjust) subjection of individuals within these groups to interrogation at will and generally aggressive techniques”.

Austen (1985) characterized paramilitary police model as: Centralized, rigid chain of command rank structured organization; strict superior-subordinate relationship; Top-down communication administered mainly through the issuance of command, directives or general order. Thus eliminating any need or urge to display initiative; Personnel are forced to operate with the use of threats and coercion mainly through a highly structured system of sanctions and institution of disciplinary procedure; Absence of flexibility when personnel are confronted with problems and situations in which the existing directives, general orders, or policy and procedure have not covered and A tendency by senior officer to be arbitrary and the concomitant feeling of demoralization and powerlessness by subordinates.

Within the paramilitary structure of the JCF is a *cultural web* which comprises of *routine* which dictates accepted way of (how) *we do things around here*; of *rituals* such as those associated with training, promotion and assessment of what is important to and valued by the organization; of *stories* amongst members, to outsiders and to new entrants exalting heroes and vilifying those who deviate from the norm; of *symbol* such as logos, offices, titles, language and terminologies representative of the nature of the organization; of *control systems*; of *power structure*; and of *formal/informal power structure* (Johnson and Scholes, 1999), which collectively represents the quintessential feature of a bureaucratic organization of rigid systems, method and procedures. There is therefore deeply embedded ‘cultural’, ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit knowledge’ (Choo, 1998) that is developed, practiced and enforced.

The major impetus for maintaining the hierarchical paramilitary and bureaucratic structure in the police force lies in its innate capacity as an effective instrument of control (Harriott, 2000; Danna, 1982; Brett, 1996). This

requires a structure of elaborate rules and formalism which ensures that except for lowest rank, at all times someone is in control and, in the case of the lower rank, the members look forward to be promoted to ranks in which they themselves can exercise control (Lindo, 1975). Invariably, promotion becomes “*an end in itself, effectively rewarding persons along the way*” (Hussey, 2008). The aggregate effect is that the command and control culture of the force results in amongst other things: *insularity*, barrier to effective communication within the organization, impediment to sound decision making and problem solving, a culture of fear, subservience as it demands obedience and silence alternative viewpoints (ibid), promoting risk aversion (Noe *et al.*, 1994) represents misfit (Fry and Berkes, 1983) and helps to reproduce an unjust social order (Harriott, 2000)

Policing in Jamaica is by no means ‘generally routine’ operation. Neither is the Force sufficiently modern, information-based or endowed with highly skilled staff so that task can be routinized. Additionally, not all law enforcement challenges present in a routinely, predictable and uniformed manner. There is for example, a social arrangement with a volatile component that is manifested in the structures popularly and appropriately labelled ‘garrisons’ with political connections (Chavannes, 1992; Figueroa and Sives, 2003; Harriott, 2003; Harriott, 2008), drugs connections (Hall and Benn, 2003) and gangs such as the ‘One Order’ and ‘Clansman’, resulting in alarming rates of murder and a set of sub-cultural norms.

Given the nature and sophistication of organized crime in Jamaica, implementation often requires at least, at the initial stage, military precision with top-down instructions informed by experts and information that is not shared amongst street-level personnel. Bottom-up implementation albeit assist with democratization of policing can be costly with the costs expanding in direct proportion to the number of people involved, the degree of conflict emanated during deliberations (Brett, 1996) and the nature of the information. On the other hand, a command and control hierarchical structure eliminates this cost by allowing managers to make unilateral decision which must be complied (Ibid). In so doing, the hierarchical organization “*reduces costs of social coordination and brings scientific knowledge to resolve problem...*” (Williamson, 1985). This hierarchical structure best suits situations in which there is limited or no social capital and organizations such as the police must act against external threats (Brett, 1996) such as those pose by organized crime.

Given the policing environment of Jamaica, there is no doubt the need for a rigid central command top-down

structure to address some urgent situations that require paramilitary treatment. But the general tasks of law enforcement are such that a majority of decision-making is conducted at the street level devoid of the top-down instructions. Policing requires interchanging at least two structures or “*structural duality*” as the condition warrants (Brett, 1996): One that requires rigid central command unit of operation to respond the crisis situations; the other (which should be in the greater case), a more decentralized consultative approach especially in dealing less serious offences such as those relating to preserving protected and endangered species.

But there is yet one other factor. The very structure of policing as a response to the dynamic of crime has given rise to the formation of various departments/subunits in the both the ISCF and JCF (JCF, 2008). The proliferation of these department/subunits has of necessity, provided a fertile ground for inter and intro-unit conflict. Conflict may be relating to role, power, prominence, attention, relevance, resources and in some cases, existence. The Traffic Enforcement unit is not concerned with offence relating of illegal vending until vendors impede the smooth flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Neither is the homicide section sees the importance of praedial larceny prevention unless it results mob killing which itself constitutes homicides. From this perspective, implementation is possible only through the management of these conflicts.

The lessons of bottom-up implementation in law enforcement are instructive as they cut across different jurisdictions. In evaluation the successes of the United States, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) Hill (2003) noted:

“From one point of view, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) was fairly straightforward social legislation: fund positions, hire police officers, do community policing. From another point of view, however, it posed a remarkable challenge to implementers... like many other social programs, this law enthusiastically endorsed reform but offered only little guidance about how to actually do it... The VCCLEA lack of clear guidance for street-level bureaucrats might lead to expectations of decreased implementation of the bill’s central directives”.

Hill made the point that written policies do not always tell implementers what to do and this potentially leads to perceptions of faulty implementation. But, in spite of this lack of specificity and in the case of the VCCLEA, she concluded that community policing (one of

its primary goals) occurred as a result of the amount of learning opportunities that street-level implementer such as police, teacher and others had brought to the process and not necessarily what legislator intended, predicted or even approved (ibid). Hill study of implementation of the VCCLEA departs somewhat from the traditional *end state* approach to an examination of individual actions that collectively created a policy.

Other studies Caribbean studies focus on police culture and resistance to change. That organizations in general tend to resist change has been the subject of many studies: Argyris (1993) offers “A *guide to overcoming barriers to organization change*” (ibid); Pardo del Val and Martinez Fuentes (2003) conducted an in-dept study of resistance to change; Armenakis and Bedeian (1990) “*selectively examined the theoretical and empirical organizational change literature*” between 1990-1998) and found among other things that “*the organizational change literature continues to be responsive to the dynamics of contemporary workplace demands*” (ibid). Resistance to change can therefore be said to be an intrinsic characteristic of all organizations and, accordingly, that resistance exist is not an issue. Instead, there has been a plethora of literature dealing with the management of resistance.

Resistance to change within law enforcement organizations has been examined within the theoretical discourse. Ortiz (1994) hypothesises that police culture acts as ‘*roadblocks*’ to organizational change; Blumberg and Niederhoffer (1985) argued that police subculture is a source of resistance to change; (Mastrofski *et al.*, 2007; Dicker, 1998) studies of implementation of community policing, found *inter alia*, that traditional culture acted as impediment to organizational change; Lingamneni (1979) found that organizational structure, leadership styles, ideology *et al.*, are “*determiners of the acceptance or rejection of policy*” (ibid), while Skolnick and Bayley (1986) observed that the police forces in general, tend to resist internal change (Harriott, 2000). The police have “*considerable capacity for resistance... (and are) keenly aware of the political impact...*” (USAID, 2007).

Police capacity to resist change is rooted deeply in the organizational culture. Within the context of the ISCF/JCF, the dominant culture of command and control (JCF, 2008), “*downward-directed*” and “*non-integrative*” (Harriott, 2000) hierarchical style of policing easily facilitate resistance to new ideas and innovations especially when *policies* by their very nature may be deliberately ambiguous and necessitate considerable discretion at the implementation stage (Baier, March and Sætren in (MacKevitte and Lawton, 1994)).

Policies for reform in policing are usually directed by politicians and frustrated by the state bureaucracy through the “engaging in a war of attrition that slows the

momentum of change and frustrates the process until reformers lose influence and power” (Mills, 1992; Harriott, 2000). Harriott’s study of the JCF found the emergence of a “defensive coalition” which utilises tactics such as “attacking outside change agents, the use of protective myths, information control and legal defensive manoeuvres” (Ibid...p.166). The aggregate result of these manoeuvres resulted in policy implementation being delayed for over two decades. Police organizational culture studies therefore conceptualise culture as an impediment or facilitator of change.

METHODOLOGY

Historically, scientific inquiries were based on logic, precision, general principles, principles of verification, the standard of rigor, gradual development, “*search for truth*” and proofs (Balashov and Rosenberg, 2002). The proofs were critical to the pure sciences before the establishment of laws, principles, theories and apparatuses. Traditionally, science therefore, was guided by positivism. Positivism holds itself to:

- The collection of quantitative data
- Separation of the researcher from the research process
- Objectivity
- Measurability
- Generalizability
- Repetition (Balashov and Rosenbery, 2002; Kuhn, 1996)

Thus, when the social science was born, the researchers embodied inquiries using the same approaches as the pure sciences. It follows that what was known about human behaviour had to be discovered through positivism and/or logical positivism. Social sciences like the natural sciences, was guided by logic (the study of valid forms of reasoning), metaphysics, the fundamental finds of things that really exist and the justification of knowledge (epistemology) which saw experimentative research been widely used to conduct inquiries. Science therefore was about the study of truth and not meanings (Balashov and Rosenberg, 2002). Why people do things, (i.e., meaning) was not important in research it was rather about the discovery of truth.

While empiricism is responsible for plethora of germane and critical discoveries that have aided humans’ existence, it fails to explore potent things about people. Peoples’ behaviours are not predictable, stationary and while some generalizability exist therein, the ‘*whys*’ (meanings) are still unasked with the use of empirical inquiry (or objectivity and measurability). Qualitative inquiry mitigates against some of the inadequacies of objectivity, provides rich data on humans’ experiences

and aids in a total understanding of people (Balashov and Rosenberg, 2002; Silverman, 2005; Neuman, 2006; Punch, 2005; Kuhn, 1996; Berg, 2001; Burnham *et al.*, 2004; Goel, 1988) Thus, qualitative inquiry should not therefore be seen as an alternate paradigm to quantitative inquiry, but as a member of the understanding apparatus. This supports Schlick (1979) argument that we cannot know the truth without knowing the meaning (p.15).

Weber (1949, 1974, 1981) was the first to argue that an 'Interpretivism' approach can be employed in the examination of social phenomenon (Haanstad, 2008). Weber opined that why human behave the way they do is lost in quantitative methodologies (or positivism). He therefore, forwarded the use of subjectivity (feels, beliefs or meanings) in social inquiry, which began the use of interpretivism in the social sciences (Rabinow and William, 1979). For years, the inquiry of social phenomenon was based on objectivity until Weber introduced an alternative paradigm. This gave rise later to the emergence of:

- Ethnography
- Phenomenology
- Case study
- Grounded theory
- Feminism
- Biography
- Historical comparative analysis

And other methodologies (discourse analysis, heuristic inquiry, action research and context analysis) were in keeping with an alternative paradigm in scientific examination as approaches in understanding human behaviours.

Thomas Kuhn postulated that science not only embodies objectivity, logic, precision and general principles as humans are social beings (Kuhn, 1996). As such, we must understand the meaning behind their behaviour which cannot be found by the use of objective methodologies. This gives rise to the use of subjective methodologies. Thomas Kuhn who had a doctorial in physics argued extensively on the validity and verifiability of qualitative inquiry despite the seemingly non-objectivity approach. Knowing how things operate was not singly embedded in empiricism, objective measurability and statistical analyses (Kuhn, 1996; Balashov and Rosenberg, 2002) as meaning accounts for actions that are sometimes outside of the realm of objectivism.

One such subjective methodologies which is long established in the literature is ethnography (Silverman, 2005; Neuman, 2006; Berg, 2001; Burnham *et al.*, 2004; Goel, 1988; Booth *et al.*, 2008; Babbie, 2007). Ethnography is one of the methodologies in qualitative research that evolved from revolution of science. It

focuses on the everyday behaviour of people (their interactions, language, ritual) in order to determine *inter alia*, cultural norms, beliefs and social structures (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). It is the "*naturalistic observations and holistic understandings of culture or subcultures*" (Babbie, 2006) or the "*art and science of describing a group or culture*" (Chevannes, 2001). In ethnography, the researcher "adopts a cultural lens to interpret observed behaviour, ensuring that the behaviours are placed in a culturally relevant and meaningful context" (Fetterman, 2010). Thus ethnography is concerned with the meaning and/or interpretation of groups within its natural settings.

Ethnography is widely used by many scholars to examine different cultural happenings in a society or sub-groups: Chevannes (2001) used this approach to determine socialization of males in the Caribbean; Gayle (2002) used ethnography to determine how adolescence survive in violent communities in St. Catherine; Levy (1996) employed this methodology to examine how people survive in urban violent community; and Schlegel and Barry (1991) examined sex role differentiation and segregation. The methodology is also used extensively in studies of organizations and, in particular, to examine behavioural issues such as those of law enforcement officials. The examples here are Westmarland (2001) who examined "*witnessing of illegal police violence*" in Britain; Behr (2002) who explored "behaviour and the thinking of officers...possession of powers and their discretion for using it" and Haanstad (2008), who examined *order* in the Thai Police Force. Organizations have culture and patterns of behaviour. And, as Silverman (2005) notes, they are fertile field for the ethnographer.

The issue under investigation also requires context analysis, document analysis, thematic identification, life history and narrative analysis. Crotty (2005) outlined that interpretivism (including phenomenology) can be a theoretical perspective that can be used to guide methods such as document analysis, content analysis, thematic identification, life history and narrative (Flick, 2006). In keeping with interpretivism theoretical perspective and the brevity of the work, multi-methodologies were used as the researcher believed that these were best suited to examine the data and understanding the complexity of the issue. According to Flick, "Content analysis is one of the classical procedures for analyzing textual material no matter where this material comes from-ranging from media products to interview data" (Behr, 2002; Flick, 2006). For further reading of the various methodologies and methods used in this work, one can review the following works (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Strauss, 1987; Crotty, 2005).

The present study will examine the following research questions:

- How has the Protective Services Division change over the years
- Does political interference plays a role in the selection of members for the Protective Services Division
- Are there disparities between the regulation of requirements and actual outlays in the Protective Services Division
- Are there disparities between the regulation of requirements and actual outlays in the Protective Services Division?
- Are there current challenges faced by members of the Protective Services Division in the execution of their duties?
- What are the differences and similarities between current and past regulations in the operations of the Protective Services Division?
- Is there standardization in materials to meet the demands for the provided services?
- Is there is modernization of intelligence gathering?
- What are some of the contemporary challenges that must be addressed in order to modernize the unit to need its operational and strategic objectives?

Data collection: Three primary instruments were used for data collection in the study; *semi-structured interviews*, *focus groups* and *document review*. Based on the nature of the unit, convenient sampling was used to collect data from respondents from police officer of the Jamaica Constabulary Force who worked or working in Professional Services Division (PSD) in St. Andrew, Jamaica. The source for data collection was from current and past employees, ranging from leader, administrators and junior staffers.

Elite interviews: Semi-structured interviews were chosen as they were closest to the unstructured interview which is *flexible*, *iterative* and *continuous* (Rubin and Rubin, 1995) as well as more likely to yield information that were not planned for (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). Semi-structured interviews allow for systematic representation and consistency while giving sufficient latitude for the subject to 'digress' thus enabling a deeper probe (Berg, 2001) and facilitating new and unexpected information (Daugbjerg, 1998). Ethnography is goes beyond what is 'seen' to what is 'meant' or 'implied' (Neuman, 2003). The use of semi-structured (instead of structured) format study enable the researcher to make deeper probe into issues that allowed for meanings to emerge which have been used to guide actions.

Elite interviews are most effective in obtaining information about decision-making and the decision-

making process (Burnham *et al.*, 2004) as the subjects may be treated as 'experts' (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001; Burnham *et al.*, 2004). The interviews took the form of a "guided conversation" (Kvale, 1996; Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Gubrium and Holstein, 2001) where the interviewees were seen not as "passive conduit for retrieving information", but more for *interpretation* and *perspective* thus facilitating a deep probe. The questions for the elite interviews were guided by the literaturereview and pre-existing notions of the researcher (Appendix I).

Focus groups: Focus group is a technique that involves people in a group discussion setting being prompt in the area under study (Neuman, 2003; Babbie, 2006). The researcher uses discussions in order to learn about the *conscious*, *semiconscious* and *unconscious* psychological and socio-cultural characteristics amongst the group (Basch, 1987; Legua *et al.*, 1992). They were used in this research in order to explore the opinions, thoughts and attitudes of respondents (Appendix II).

Two major advantages of focus group approach in qualitative research are:

- That the natural setting allows participants to freely express opinions, ideas and feelings
- Focus groups foster expression amongst marginalized social groups

Within the hierarchical structure of paramilitary forces, the most marginalized group are located at the base or street-level. However, once members are not on duty they often expressed themselves unimpeded. Within the context of the focus group discussions, participants quickly abandoned the rank structure and openly expressed their thoughts, feelings and desires thus developing what Stewart and Shamdasani, (1990) and Sussman *et al.* (1991) call the *synergistic group effect* in which interactions among and between group members stimulate discussions and reactions having gained the trust of the researcher.

Document reviews: The researcher reviewed written documents such as Force Orders, U.S State Department training manuals, training manuals of the JCF, written relevant communications Professional Standards Branch. The reviews were to determine the existence of what obtained, the deficiencies and strategies (or the lack of) when in the past and current undertaken. A major reason for the document review was to assist in triangulating and validating information obtained in the interview, given that interviews "rarely constitutes the sole source of data in research" (Johnson and Scholes, 1999; Gubrium and Holstein, 2001; Bryman, 2001; Hertz and Imber, 1995).

Sampling: The logic of sampling is to make inferences about the population (Berg, 2001; Goel, 1988). Unlike quantitative approach in which there is a huge emphasis on probability sampling for representation, qualitative research design often utilizes non-probability sampling. In non-probability sampling, the researchers strive to create a “kind of quasi-random sample and/or to have a clear idea about what larger group or groups the sampling may reflect” (Berg, 2001; Babbie, 1992). In this study, the work was limited to those whom are working or have worked in the Division, which makes for non-probability sampling technique.

One non-probability sampling approach in qualitative research is purposive or judgemental sampling. Effective use of purposive sampling techniques requires that the researcher utilise his/her special knowledge or expertise of the subject that is largely representative of the population (Babbie, 1992).

Data analysis: Three concurrent actions are pertinent in the analysis of qualitative data: Data reduction, data display and conclusions and verification (Berg, 2001). In this research, a substantial amount of raw data taken in note form was retrieved during the interviews and focus group sessions. The researcher utilized a thematic approach (Crotty, 2005) in focussing, simplifying, transforming thus reducing the voluminous raw data into different themes. Having formulated a variety of themes, they were then used to shape the format of the presentation of findings (narrative, summative) which later informed conclusions and verifications. In cases where respondents were asked to rate a particular event, these were presented in a tabular form.

Limitations to the study: This study utilizes non-probability sampling technique which means that the results are:

- Non-generalizable
- Non-predictable
- Specialised to the respondents
- Non-repeatable

However, these methods still provide insightful, rich and critical information about the studied phenomenon. Like Thomas Kuhn and Max Weber opined, qualitative research is equally informative and scientific as quantitative research.

Operational definitions:

Policy: The outcomes of actions or non-action after the implementation stage.

Implementation: a process and a component of the policy cycle.

Intelligence agent: is “The agent assigned to gather protective intelligence prior to the visit of the principal” (U.S Department of States, 2009), which is used in this study.

Protective intelligence: is “All information relating to any individual, group, or activity which might effect the security of the principal” (U.S Department of States, 2009), which is used in this study.

Advance: According to the US Department of States, this is “All security activities, plans and arrangements made prior to or in connection with the movement of a principal to a given area” (U.S Department of States, 2009), which is used in this study.

Threat level: is “The degree of danger that exists at any given time as determined by analysis of available information and intelligence” (U.S Department of States, 2009), which is used in this study.

FINDINGS AND RESULTS

Development: During one of the focus group sessions, a VIP agent noted that Special Branch began in 1960 out of a need to protect Queen Victoria. Since then VIP protection was provided by Special Branch for Heads of States, special dignitaries, Prime Ministers and other individuals. It was revealed that the protection of former Prime Minister Alexander Bustamante was somewhat challenges because of his personality and actions. Former Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Ransford ‘Bagga’ Ellis commented that Sir Alexander ‘Busta’ Bustamante was difficult to close protect as he was unorthodox, while former Prime Minister Hugh Shearer would willingly take instructions and listened to the dictates of Special Branch. Ellis noted that the formal training in close protection began in 1975 when the British would train members of Special Branch in the approaches of VIP protection. Current VIP Agents whom started VIP close Protection with Special Branch collaborated Ellis’ argument but modified Ellis’ date of VIP close protection training dating back to the 1960s. This was later changed when in the 1980s, when the United States’ Secret Service began training VIP agents in close protection and other issues relating to VIP Protection.

Prior to the US Secret Service training of VIP agents in Jamaica, Special Branch carried the portfolio of close protection in addition to Intelligence Gathering. Both Ellis and Other Agents opined that Special Branch was increasingly called upon to provide close protection services, which was somewhat outside of its primary mandate of intelligence gathering. In response to the

growing demands on Special Branch for close protection services, a decision was taken to separate close protection from intelligence gathering, which was the emergence of Protective Services Division (PSD) in September 1, 1979 at 3A Ruthven Road, Kingston 10. Former ACP Ellis postulated that PSD began its operation following the 1980 general election. Other Agents gave a different version as they commented that PSD began operational immediately after it was established in 1979. During the focus group discussion, all the longstanding agents remarked that Roy McGann whom was killed in upper St. Andrew had a VIP agent and that his agent died in the same incident which is the first and only one in Jamaica's history. McGann was a member of parliament who was murdered in 1979 leading up to the general elections of 1980.

All the agents as well as former ACP, Ransford Ellis, believed that Roy McGann's death gave impetus to a special training of VIP agents. This special training of VIP agents exclusively on VIP protection was introduced by the US Secret Service following the 1980 general election and this has continued since that time. The Agents forwarded that PSD, during the early years of its inception, would call upon Special Branch to assist it with VIP close protection of Heads of States and international dignitaries because of staffing limitation.

Function: Former Assistant Commission Ransford 'Bagga' Ellis whom once headed PSD argued that the operational functions of the Unit following the 1980 general election were mostly unorthodox. Ellis commented that political interference sometimes retards command; rogue VIP agents were oftentimes difficult to man as they were not purely accountable to the dictates of the Divisional commands and supervision was sometimes outside of the directions of the Unit.

The focus group discussions highlighted how systematic weaknesses in the structure of PSD leading up to 2002, VIP agents were lords onto themselves. Although VIP agents whom were assigned to politicians were police officers and should operate as such, they were oftentimes the extension of the VIP's delegation. VIP agents in the 1980s extended their operational duties to include political campaigning and rogue behaviours.

Ellis as well as other agents commented that VIP agents would be taking the hand luggage of their VIPs, doing outside chores such as supermarket duties and sometimes they were not in close proximity to the VIPs. Even though the VIP agents were trained in close protection and knew their substantiate assignments, political VIPs would have them carry out duties that are outside of the function of an agent. During the focus group discussion, agents lamented that prior to 2002, agents whom choose not to take on non-agent duties

would be reprimanded by their seniors and sometimes transfers followed.

Former ACP Ransford Ellis opined that "some VIP agents were unable to be controlled" and that their function extended beyond the dictates of the hierarchical command. And that the relationship between VIP and agents was sometimes an "incestuous one" which compromise the reputation of Division.

The current agents argued the political infiltration of VIP agents into the politics over time resulted into the introduction of 'Black and Red Vest' in the 1990s in order to reduce the function of VIP agents into the political culture in political season.

PSD functional operatives have changed since Ransford Ellis' time and the present. Current agents noted that since the stream lining of the PSD since 2002 and Force Order 3306 (published 14th October 2010), there are clear guidelines as to the function of VIP agents. They argued strongly that VIP agents can with respect inform their VIP of the function of an agent and what contravenes standards. Force Order 3306 gives teeth to the function of PSD, agents can now operate within a professional manner without fear of victimization, transfer and reprimand by senior officers for failure to follow the dictates of VIP that contradicts the duties of an agent.

All currents VIP operatives remarked that agents who function inside of the mandate of the Force orders number "3306" are unlikely to be victimized which reduces psychological insecurity, anxiety, uneasiness and tendency of agents to arbitrarily subscribe to the request of their VIPs or to the milieu in which they operate.

Transformation: Ransford Ellis believed that there is a need for the transformation of PSD and this had started during his time but the lack of structural changes retarded intended progression. Retired ACP and former head of PSD, Ellis, is still alive and although he no longer works in the Division, the transformation was noted by current agents. One agent remarked that "significant transformation of PSD is now" and they boast of Force Order 3306. "Force Order 3306 is what they had always wanted" commented a present agent and this binds, retards, suppresses the probability of wayward agents and VIP whom may be inclined to desire social deviant behaviour.

Force Order 3306 was quoted over 50 times in a 2 h focus group discussion with agents. Agents were proud of what they referred to as "3306" and one agent referred to this in interpreting all and any likely social deviance. In fact, agents were proud to note that transformation is such that many officers from different division now desire a transfer to the Division. They quickly pointed out that the rationale for such application may vary, but what is factual is such desire was initially based on political patronage including the likeliness of promotion. The

willingness of officers to desire a transfer to PSD is a signal of structural transformation and the bridging of the gap of PSD and other Division with the force.

Inspector (Insp) Robert Walker recalled an incident which encapsulated the transformation of PSD. He commented that during the by-elections in St. Ann, there was a growing tension between the two main political parties' (Jamaica Labour Party, JLP and Peoples' National Party, PNP) supporters and it appeared some conflict was likely to unfold. Inspector Walker commented that when he went to the scene, he publicly walked over to the VIP agent for the other political party and asked him for an update on the matter. They talked for some time and some people openly commented that "yu no from the other party" and that incidence was a turning point of a likely feud.

All the agents noted that in early years, police on duty with political VIPs were an extension arm of the politician and this meant that an agent of the opposing VIP would not speak with each other. Although Ransford "Bagga" Ellis did not witness this happening, he argued that some agents in the 1980 to 1990s were politicians. The political divide was obvious that outside or inside political campaigning season some agents did not speak with agents of the opposing VIPs.

Insp Walker's account for what transpired in the St. Ann by-election for a member of parliament of North East St. Ann (in 2010) showed the past political culture and how this was embedded in the wider society. Agents of political VIP were stigmatized as a part of the political arm of the VIPs, which Ellis noted has historical tenets dating back to the 1970s. Ellis commented that this was not only one sided as agents placed into the stigma and were actually a critical part of political machinery.

Stigmatization: During the elite interview with former Assistant Commissioner and head of PSD, Ellis commented that while the stigmatization of police officers had some merit and that this may never be eradicated, stigmatization remains enlarge a psychological and personal issue. Ellis, Insp Walker, Insp Heron-Samuel and others said they have all been stigmatized and have watched this dissipated over the years. Agents were passionate about this area, many spoke at length, experiences were related and only one two persons in the two focus group discussions did not offer a comment.

Some of the agents such as Insp Heron-Samuel and Walker as well as others have been assigned to political VIPs of both parties, which is aiding in lowering the stigmatization and increasing the professionalism of the Division. All the current agents remarked that stigmatization has been rescinding owing to the clear line of demarcation of the roles and functions of agents, the standards and expectations of agents and the informed

position that police are officers employed to the Jamaica Constabulary Force and there is a divide between politics and the roles of agents. And that politicking during their assignment is totally unacceptable and warrants displacement. The changes began in the 1990s; agents were more professional in their duties and act with non-political biasness.

One of the agents recalled that when he was first asked and assigned some 16 years ago to PSD he "refused to come" because of the political stigmatization. The agent noted that he has come to see police officers asking him about transfer, wanting to come to the unit, loving the unit's transformation and the Division's professionalism is now a hallmark that is desired by other sections of the force. Although the issue of stigmatization is gradually changing and the image is being refashioned, Ransford Ellis commented that "We cannot get off the curse from PSD"

Political interference: When the issue of political interference was brought up during the focus groups discussion and the elite interviews, agents spoke at length unlike for the other issues. Ellis commented that Kerron Smith (pseudo name) and Knight Bourne (pseudo name) were evidence of political interference in PSD. He argued that Ford who was known by former Prime Minister Percival James Patterson from before the governance of Prime Minister Manley's administration in the 1970s was brought into PSD and later rapidly promoted as was the case for Knight Bourne. Ellis commented while heading PSD, he has had defiant junior officers and had to speak to the VIP about the function, role and responsibility of the agent.

The current agents referred to some of the political agents as rogue police. The consensus is that some police officers would on a new political administration (change of party and governance) inform PSD members to lead their position. One agent said that "rogue cop of politicians on a new political administration would say pack yu bag and leave as mi a com if de office." Enblocked transfers were noted in the 1970 and 1980s because of a change of political administration.

Prior to 2002, politicians could request a particular agent because of locality during the campaigning period and trust was based on personally knowing the officer and appointment were not necessarily based on professionalism. The agents including Ellis noted that political tribalism had infiltrated the wider police force, which was used to change, recruit, reward and punish close protective agents at PSD or Special Branch.

One agent chronically present the periods, political interference, structure, functions, promotion and movement of agents. He commented that during 1970s

through 1980s, political agents (“rogue cops”) were rewarded for their involvement during the political campaigning season. This was evident as agents would adorn themselves in political colours (green or orange), be an extension of the political machinery of particular parties and this was a prerequisite for entrance into the Division. The political culture at the time in the society was equally represented in the force, especially PSD and agents twinned their involvement as political being and VIP agents as a means of hold or seeking inclusion in PSD.

Insp Heron-Samuel commented that he has been called a politician, which was echoed by Ellis, Walker and other agents. Heron-Samuel said that “This is usually by colleagues in [the] general policing.” Insp Walker’s opined that he has been assigned with the current VIP for eleven years and that “The stigma concerned the action and attitude of some of my colleague police officers from other operational division.” But he noted that “I have experienced a change in political administration at the division and observed that the main impact I have on staff members overall and the uncertainty of being transferred to other division and the treatment that will be meted out by their colleagues in other divisions.”

Length of service/ involvement: The average length of service of agents whom were interviewed was 16 years, with there being 27 years service. Embodied in the length of service of agents is the crossing of political administration and that some agents had worked with VIP from the two political parties (JLP and PNP).

Political administration: One senior agent (length of service) commented that the agents were debriefed on the change of political administration as in the past transferred occurred that “The CP usually give an overview of the group’s performance and this is usually followed by a stress management lecture.”

All the participants noted that whole change of agents as what obtained in the 1970 and 1980s has significantly change, which is evident based on some of their length of service. In fact they commented that little if any transfers occurred when the new political administration that was instituted in 2007. However, the participants indicated that what has changed is the frequency in training compared to the 1970, 1980 and 1990s to now.

Training: The participants noted that there are weekly in-service (Division) trainings as well as periodic US Secret Service seminars and JCF training school’s certifications. Outside of JCF, US Secret Service and in-service training, many of the staffers are reading for Associate, Bachelor and Master of Science degrees in addition to supervisory

management, conflict and dispute resolution and other training.

A document on role and function of PSD outlined training requirements of new recruits and the training can be had from Special Branch or PSD. It should be noted here that there is no longer a Special Branch in the JCF. The paper on the aforementioned issue state clearly that “The persons recruited will be thoroughly vetted to ensure that the most suitable persons are taken on board.”

Ransford Ellis commented that the training of PSD agents is too narrow and that this must be widened similarly to that offered to US Secret Service agents. He lamented the coverage, scope and knowledge of PSD agents that they need to be multi-tasked so as to be to offer a myriad of services in and related to close protection. Other agents agreed with Ellis’ comment and add that the modernization of the Division has not changed, particularly resource deficiencies. Even in the US Secret Service training, they outlined many areas in VIP programmes that include antiterrorism assistance, human rights and community engagement, force continuum, marksmanship, radio communication, explosive devices, emergency medical action and others that can be employed in other division as well as PSD.

Former ACP Ransford ‘Bagga’ Ellis outlined that he received Basic Protection Training as component of his Special Branch training in 1968. He as well as retired SSP Timothy Rhone was first individuals to be trained as Teachers of VIP protection in 1975.

Modernization: All the current agents argued that Force Order ‘3306’ (dates 14th October 2010) is a hallmark for actions (or inactions) of agents and is the ‘Blueprint’ they have been waiting for. Ransford Ellis said that PSD has been experiencing incremental changes and that was needed. The modernization that Ellis envisioned is embodied partially in Force Order 3306 according to the participants. Force Order 3306 outlined:

- Standard operating procedure
- Function of the PSD
- Command structure
- Dress code
- Selection of officers for PSD
- The inclusion of threat assignment
- The stipulations of a reserved unit, its function
- The engagement of academia as an approach to understanding the coverage needed for PSD, with changes and assist in providing information on people’s behaviour from a research perspectives that will be included in PSD planning

A part of the modernization of PSD, officers from Mobile Reserve are been trained in close protection. The rationale for this is embedded in the growing need for

close protection agents and the ability of PSD to supply these personnel on demand if needs be.

Another aspect to the modernization is the separation of PSD from operational arm of the JCF, especially Special Branch. This will allow PSD to independently carry out its mandate, eliminate political interference, victimization and rogue political agents and the PSD document stated that "... [This will allow PSD] to carry out its functions in an efficient and effective manner." Those sentiments were echoed by current agents and provide an understanding of the rationale for a feeling of job security, carrying their mandate and retard VIPs whom may be inclined to use agents outside of the prescribed assigned duties.

During the focus group sessions, one participant said that "There is usually a feeling of demoralization of agents on the change of a political administration. Some members are affected by the sudden change of status of their VIPs", which was on the case in 2007 on the change of PNP to the JLP's administration in the governance seat. Another participant argued that the change has been fundamental moreso since October 2010. The agent revealed that "I have seen modernization (or change) in the division since the new SOP or the reorganization of the PSD in October 2010. I have seen significant change as threat assessment [has been included] and done on a VIP to determine if s/he is to be assigned a CPO and the VIPs request for [the] selection of officers for their CPO is no longer entertained."

Insp Walker, Heron-Samuel and other agents noted that they have witnessed and experienced modernization moreso in the last 10 years, compared to previous decades. Walker revealed that the modernization includes

- Administrative
- Tactical

Changes in how VIP protection is conceptualized, operationalized and executed. The training of District Constables, training of outside officers from Mobile Reserves, EOD (Explosive Ordinance Demolition), threat assessment, equipment (including computers, laptops, facsimile, cell-phones, machines, multi-media devices and other electronic items).

Mistrust: One participant said that outside of the modernization of PSD is the trust and respect of the head of Division for junior staffers. The participant commented that if the event a VIP called to report an agent, the matter is examined by the commander and then actions are taken. The officer noted that if the agent is within the mandate of his/her assignment and his/her VIP had requested something outside of the agents' duties, the VIP informed of this and if the agent was wrong, s/he is so reprimanded. Agents expressed trust in the current structure as well

their commander has the vested interest in the effective functioning of the Division, its professionalism and not political leveraging as in earlier times. Even though, many of the agents said that Ransford 'Bagga' Ellis manned a professional unit, but argued that he did not have the structural framework that began with the introduction of '3306'.

The current structure holds agents accountable for their actions and that all professional behaviour will be sanctioned by the commander. Ellis noted that "A man should know that he is held accountable for his action" and this allows agents to work within this construct and not of the political dictates or the will of the political directorates.

All the participants indicated that there is mistrust among members in other divisions and PSD agents as they consider "us to be politicians and not police." Heron-Samuel opined that "I have never experienced any mistrust from other police officers in the field. But most of my other colleagues [VIP agents] said they have experienced mistrust from their colleagues whilst on duty in the field."

Promotion: The promotion matter continues to be a sore point in the JCF. And one participant pointed out that the general view that promotion is based on political influences, especially in PSD, is held by some people. He, however, noted that the possibilities are still the same but that the probability is extremely low, if not unlikely.

The product that PSD is working on is highly professional Division, which is different from that which obtained prior to 2010. "Long gone is the day when an agent is promoted based on political affiliation and on his merit, achievement and promotion in keeping with the new mandate" remarked one of the participants.

A few of the agents had received all their promotions at PSD, over different administration and one said he had never been denied any "promotional opportunities as a result of being at PSD."

Victimization and transfers: All the participants echoed the sentiment that in the past, victimization was one the weapons used by senior officers. Junior officers were so tense that on the during the campaign season they worry about a change in political administration. It was the likely wholesale change of officers that stimulate political policing as personnel positioned themselves for appointment on the nomination of their party to power. The old officers (agents) were seen as outcast, reassigned, discarded and the structure was to belittle, frustrate and sideline these agents.

Former ACP and head of HSD, Ransford Ellis, said that he was sent to "Never, Never Land" (or Inspectorate Branch) as punishment on the change of a political administration. Ellis glowed and had a gleam in his eyes

when he spoke his experience as Inspectorate Branch and how he used the time to effectively carry out his duties. Other agents (currently) remarked that transfers were so expected and embedded in the culture that we volunteered for reassignment on the change of political administration. This was emphasised when one participant revealed that on one occasion, the entire PSD was reassigned and replaced with new members and that some of them were previously not trained in close protection.

Knowledge and competence: The continuous training and re-trained of agents have provided a highly skilled, knowledge and competent workforce at PSD. Ellis remarked that agents were highly equipped with knowledge and skills since the time of Special Branch, but that the “lack of knowledge is not excuse” as level of service demand well trained staffers. Members of PSD well highly trained in their areas, but equipment lags behind human capabilities.

The formal educational development of PSD staffers provides additional depth the value of the product. Ellis commented that “we have lost brain and respect”, “afraid of criticism and failure” and have failed to recognize people in the provision of the service deliverables. One senior officer opined that current PSD emphasise courtesy, respect and conflict resolution in order to enhance the product quality.

The in-service trainings have simulation components that provide agents with tools, techniques, knowledge and expectations for the assignment. In addition to the aforementioned issue, the continuous debriefing, stress management experiences and ...are geared towards the not only training but deliverables by the agents.

Equipment: Ellis postulated that during his headship at PSD and earlier involvement in close protection, equipment has been difficult to attain and oftentimes lag behind the demands of the job. All participants cried about the deficiency in equipment, especially vehicle and firearms. On perusal of the training manual (VIP Protection), it stated that agents should be provided with standardized weaponry. The reality at PSD is remarkable disparities between firearms and vehicles. One participant said “how are we to provide highly professional services, when the fleet is old, compared to those of the VIP.” Another agent related an incidence of having a puncture and mechanical problems while executing his duties. These was nothing atypical as other agents lamented about the same problems and one even went as far as to say that “how do we follow a VIP in a 2010 luxury vehicle, when our are 1990 models.”

The equipment disparity may not appear a real concern, but when an agent suggested that we examine an incident where extra ammunitions are needed on a special

assignment and noted that members have different guns that are incompatible. The US Secret Service VIP Protection manual speak to this as it recommended that equipment, particularly gun, must be a standard Glock, semi-automatic, 9 mm pistol with each agents supplied with additional ammunition in case this is needed. The argument purported for the standardization of the transferability of ammunition in the event another agent requires more in an instance of crisis. However, at PSD the weapons used are M16 Assault rifle, Uzi, Sub-Machine guns, MP5 Sub-Machine, Browning 9 mm pistol, Glock 9 mm pistol, Remington shotgun and 0.38 Revolver.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In different nations the need for a Special Branch or Protective Services Division develops out of a wide range of reasons. The reason for the establishment of PSB or Special Branch was always fundamentally the same across nations, threat and protection. While the evolution of PSB or Special Branch began in nations like Ireland, United States and Britain in the late-1800s to early 1900s, Jamaica which is a young democracy (got Independence on August 1, 1962) was the emergence of Special Branch in late 1900s. Like in other jurisdiction, Special Branch in Jamaica as assigned to collect intelligence and close protection was added in 1960. The development of the Protective Services Division in the JCF blossomed over time and finally culminated into a different Unit from Special Branch in 1979 (Green-Grant, 2008; JCF, 2005; JCF, 2010).

Enough evidence is there to support the modernization of PSD in Jamaica. In the early years, PSD has seen political interference in its operation. It was only political interference that PSD was noted for as it had politicking members whom sometimes openly engaged in politicking campaigning. In return for locality, politicians would reward rogue and political police officers for their involvement in the political machinery by promotion and appointment to PSD. The hierarchical structure of the force meant that politicians would request the appointment of particular police officers to PSD, request certain officers to be their agents. The request would be granted because of the fear of political victimization; promotional opportunities and political favours. Politician exploited the social structure, small size of nation and the power of senior commanders to have junior staffers carry out their wills.

The polarization of the PSD was equally the same across the wider JCF and politics divided the society and the force was no exception (Harriott, 2000, 2003, 2008; Robotham, 2003; Sives, 2003). The PSD operated for

decades with political interference, the politician divided the wider society and this was a tool used by them to control some of the states' men. Former ACP and head of PSD commented that "history is not been used to our [police] advantage" as the police have used the past to reorganize the force in such a way that it is free from external politics. The plantation legacy felt by the British is used by the present upper class as well as exploited by politicians and is a channel as a method of segregation and unequal treatment (Lindo, 1975; Holstede, 1983; Eyre, 1986; Stone, 1988; Headley, 1992). It is this reality that accounts for the politicking of police, the arbitrary displacement of officers, unwitting transfer, victimization and promotion of loyalists.

In keeping with the hierarchical command structure of the police force, policies are made from top, communicated and executed by those at the bottom (Esman, 1991; Grindle and Thomas, 1991), which cripples junior staffers and becomes stimulation for politicking in order to receive promotional favours. Although there are assignments to and promotion of some members in PSD as well as the sidelining of others because of perceived political alignment, this is typically the case across the landscape of JCF. Former ACP Ransford Ellis indicated that there is unwillingness to break the back of political interference in the Force as it serves self-interest. He noted that people (officers) must be made accountable for their actions and there should be clear consequences for actions (or inactions) in addition to rewards.

Grindle and Thomas (1991) noted that the characteristics of *uncertain information, poverty, pervasive state influence in the economy and centralization of decision-making* resulting from colonial rule have caused decision makers to emerge as *central actors* (p.45). Such perspective offers an understanding of how covert political commanders and relieve junior of their engagement in PSD, exploit some, demoralize others and destroy the human capital of non-supporter all in the game of benefit. Not having a structure for some time, PSD's functions were primarily based on the hierarchy, which was used as a benefit in the name of professional conduct. It should come, therefore, as no surprise that during the 1980s to early 1990s, there were overabundance of dismissals, forced resignation or conviction of government ministers and leaders of security forces as a result of corruption. The reason is embedded in people been adept at paying to cut red tape in order to "transform the distant public administrator into a friendly patron" (Jones, 1985).

Untrained officers requesting transfers to PSD prior to 2010 was in anticipation of promotion or waiting their turn for power and patronage. Members look forward to

be promoted to ranks in which they themselves can exercise control (Lindo, 1975). Invariably, promotion becomes "*an end in itself, effectively rewarding persons along the way*" (Hussey, 2008), which was used and exploited by the political directorates. Even this was retarding the quality of the deliverables and the product offered by the police, especially PSD, self-interest predominate the conscious of officers more than the job as they wanted a chance to exhibit power. The unstructured system that operated at PSD before the 2000, particularly 2010, was a loophole for unprofessional conduct from junior as well as senior staffers and explains the misfits (Fry and Berkes, 1983) and helps to reproduce an unjust social order (Harriott, 2000).

The public began calling for professionalism from police officers, PSD was increasingly was been scrutinized and something had to be done to change the image of the Force, especially PSD. The critical question that had to be addressed is how to remove politics from PSD and have it function as a professional arm of the JCF? Within the context that people are resistance to change, modernization was critical to transformation and reduced stigmatization of the Division. But how was this to be done? In general, organizations tend to resist change has been the subject of many studies: Argyris (1993) offers "*A guide to overcoming barriers to organization change*"; Pardo del Val and Martinez Fuentes (2003) conducted an in-depth study of resistance to change; Armenakis and Bedeian (1990) "*selectively examined the theoretical and empirical organizational change literature*" between 1990-1998) and found among other things that "*the organizational change literature continues to be responsive to the dynamics of contemporary workplace demands*".

Ortiz (1994) hypothesises that police culture acts as '*roadblocks*' to organizational change; Blumberg and Niederhoffer (1985) postulated that police subculture is a foundation of resistance to change; Mastrofski *et al.* (2007) and Dicker (1998) studies of implementation of community policing, found *inter alia*, that traditional culture acted as impediment to organizational change; Lingamneni (1979) found that organizational structure, leadership styles, ideology *etc.*, are "*determiners of the acceptance or rejection of policy*" (ibid), while Skolnick and Bayley (1986) observed that the police forces in general, tend to resist internal change (Harriott, 2000). It was no surprise that the introduction of a commander whom once served as a junior office in PSD began resonating with the agents and modernization was welcomed without resistance.

Force Orders 3306 was welcome by the agents as they had sought a leader whom understand the challenges of the tasks, stigmatization of the portfolio and someone

whom genuinely wanted to allay some of the challenges of the past. The new commander is trusted by the agents as many of them knew of his impartiality, political neutrality, fair mindedness and upstanding character. Threat assessment was instituted under the commander as a part of the modernization and transformation of the Division, Force Order 3306 and other guidelines that were streamlining the professionalism of the Unit. Although the transformation is a work in progress, the stigmatization continues and its life appears to be trailing the PSD and its agents. Former Assistant Commissioner and head of PSD opined that "We cannot get off the curse from PSD" and that the preoccupation with this stigma will delay the task at hand.

The new structured framework outlines the functions of agents and the PSD. These are intended to retard the likeliness of victimization, political interference, politicking of agents and lower the mistrust of VIPs on their agents. Among the issues which emerged from the present findings is the low probability of political interference, the fair handedness in evaluating complaints from VIPs. VIP can no longer dictate the need for agents, whom they want and even be presumption to suggest promotion for agents. Many of the loopholes that once existed that were used and exploited by politicians and commanders have been close and people recognize the intended seriousness to modernize and transform the PSD into a professional entity.

The quality of PSD cannot be currently equated to US Secret Service as it relates to professionalism, equipment and machinery, training, perception of quality performance and expertise, but the process has been started with the intent to make the Division internationally competitive. The volume of applications of members from the wider population of the JCF to be involved in this Division is a testament to the transformation and modernization that have been taking place since 2000.

The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) like the wider society is plagued by a myriad of problems. Horace Levy captured this well in when he said that:

The easy availability and the large number of guns in the inner-city today seems to be indeed a very important factor in the upsurge in gangs and dons and the appearance of quite difficult climate in violence" (Levy, 1996).

Levy suggested an entrenchment of criminality in society and the highlighted the challenges facing the police to solve not only violent crimes, but all crimes. He noted that the link between the trade in drugs and crime was the gun, which he said now "arm the violence, raising its level and widening its criminal reach" (p. 29). Similar concerns have captured the interests of the international community. United Nations and World Bank (2007) study

entitled 'Crime, violence and development: Trends, costs and policy options in the Caribbean' noted that:

[T]he Governments of the Caribbean countries recognize the seriousness of the problem and are exploring innovative policy responses at both the national and regional levels. Civil society organizations are doing their part as well by designing and implementing violence prevention programs targeting youth violence, violence against women and other important forms of violence (United Nations and World Bank, 2007).

On examination of historical tenets of the JCF, particularly the PSD, it should not be surprising the unprofessional behaviour had crept into the Division. Politics had made an inroad into the consciousness of police officers. PSD members were at one time in the history of the force political activists; and the allegations are many as to their roles in political tribalism. During the periods of the 1970 and 1980s, the evidence supports the involvement of PSD members in on toward civil behaviours that contravenes the sanctity of the Force. And poverty, high cost of living and unemployment were among the key economic indicators (PIOJ and STATIN, 1990-2011; PIOJ, 1979-2011) that held the masses at hostage. The economic climate accounts for the 'fight' for 'political spoils' (resources and favours), which accounted for the actions (or inactions) of member of the PSD as well as the wider JCF.

The evolution and revolution of PSD cannot cease with the current modernization and transformation as those are a part of the way forward and not an end of themselves. There is still more work to be done before PSD can be compared with international agencies of its type. The process has afforded a Division that is now eyed by other police officers and this desire is outside of political favouritism, promotional opportunities and the power structure. The modernization and transformation of PSD have been slow and incremental; but is undoubtedly timely. These are in keeping with the general reorganization of the Force and should be supported as the end of the transformation must be that of an internationally comparable Division and not mere changes.

In summary, PSD has had a long life and this has been painstakingly slow, but the life has provided the impetus for new professional Division that is free of political interference, political patronage and power driven people who seek to serve their personal interest and not that of the general organization (JCF).

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations germinated from the study:

- New applicants must go through one process (ie vetting, interviews, psychological evaluation)
- Equipment must be standardized (ie weapons, type of vehicles needed for protective operations)
- There is need for succession planning
- Make PSD an Executive Agency where operatives work on secondments
- All applicants must pass a corruption polygraph test in addition to other examination before acceptance
- Use the expertise of retired members in training programme of new and existing agents
- Agents must have a time limit (5-year rotation)
- Agent-entry requirement for PSD will be higher than that of the general Force
- VIPs need to be brought on board on the new image of PSD and their roles in its (handbooks to be given to VIPs on their roles and function and they will sign to this)
- Members of PSD must be multi-skilled (first aid, bomb technician, training in special operations (SWAT TEAM)
- Retraining (requalification-refresher course)

Appendix I:

Interview Instrument

Re-New Professionalism in Protection Services Operations in the Jamaica Constabulary Force (Commander Level)

Semi-Structure Interview

- What was your rank and position whilst serving at the Protective Services Division?
- Did you have any formal training or briefing in VIP Protection Operations?
- What are the selection process for personnel at the division and required qualifications?
- When was Protective Services Division form?
- Are most of your locally trainings done by International Trainers?
- Were Threat Assessments done on VIPs before assigning of Close Protection Officer?
- Are there reasons for modernization of the division?
- Did you have a data base of all Threats and Potential Threats and files on individuals, gangs, groups etc capable of carrying out threats?
- Did the division progress over the years and if so, explain how it has?
- Did you have a rotation of Staff over a specific period?
- What is the attrition rate of Staff at the Protective Services Division?
- Were you getting timely intelligence on National Security matters, Threats etc?
- Did you experience any political interference in your operation at the division?
- Did you experience any promotion by political influence within the division?
- Was there any Psychological Evaluation of staff done and how frequently?
- Did you have sufficient technical and human resource to function effectively?
- Did you get quality support from other Divisional Commanders for your protection operations?
- Did you have regular development courses internally and otherwise for staff members?
- Did you have the necessary communicating network to have full command and control of all security operations by staff members?

- Did you have a clear mandate or Standard Operations Procedures for the division?

Appendix II:

Focus Group Interview Questions

- What is the role of political interference on PSD in the past?
- Explain the shift in stigmatization of employees in PSD since its inception to present.
- How has politics resulted in promotion in the past?
- Has there being modernization and transformation at PSD from 1979 and trace their evolution?
- Are equipment in keeping with international standards and what are the differences?
- Examine PSD post-October 2011
- Can be transformation and modernization of PSD revert to the old order (prior to October 2011)?
- Why is it difficult to revert to the traditional operational and cultural practices at PSD?
- How long have you been stationed at the Protective Services Division?
- Have you received any formal training in VIP Protection?
- Have you ever received any other development courses whilst serving at Protective Services Division?
- Throughout the years have you been on any refresher's course in VIP Protection?
- What is your rank and position as a Close Protection Officer in the fields?
- How long have you been assigned to your present VIP?
- How long have you ever been assigned to a VIP and what effects if any, it has on your professionalism or otherwise?
- Have you ever been assigned to another VIP or a different role whilst serving at the Protective Services Division?
- Are you assigned to a VIP from the Political Directorate or otherwise?
- If you have been assigned to a VIP from a Political Directorate, have you ever been stigmatized as a result of your assignment?
- Have you ever experience a change of Political Administration whilst at the Protective Services Division and what impact did it have on the staff especially those remaining at the division?
- Is there usually a general debrief of Protective Services Division staff at a change of Political Administration?
- Is there any level of mistrust among your colleagues in general policing when operating in the fields?
- Is there a feeling of demoralization from staff member assigned to the Political Directorate at the change of an Administration?
- Do you see any modernization within the division since its new mandate or Standard Operation Procedures?
- Are you satisfied that the management team is competent and experienced to fully modernize the division with its new Standard Operations Procedures?
- Have you ever been transfer from Protective Services at the change of a Political Administration? What was your experience like during reintegration?
- Do you believe that you have been denied any promotional opportunity as a result of serving at Protective Services Division?

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