Abstract

This study aims to investigate the restriction effect of corporate governance on over-investment in food industry. Market value of a firm can be damaged by over-investment activities. Much effort has been made on the control of enterprises’ over-investment based on ownership structure; however, limited work has been done to address the restriction effect of corporate governance on over-investment. Using the data from 2002 to 2009 of Chinese non-financial listed companies as samples, this study empirically studied the restriction effect of corporate governance on over-investment which was measured based on the Richardson model. The results show that, firstly, there is a significant negative relation between ownership concentration and over-investment, that is, concentrated ownership can restrict the over-investment. Secondly, the splitting of the positions of Chef Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman also can help to restrict overinvestment of listed companies. Thirdly, there is a significant negative correlation between managerial stock ownership and over-investment; in other words, the over-investment in the company with higher proportion of managerial owned shares is significantly higher than that of a company with lower proportion of managerial owned shares. However, non-state-owned dependent director and board of supervisors cannot restrict the over-investment of listed companies effectively. Further evidence shows that industry competition and market process can influence the restriction effect of corporate governance on over-investment. According to the above results, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to restrict over-investment of listed companies from the perspective of corporate governance.

Keywords:

Corporate governance, food industry, over investment, restriction effect,

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Competing interests

The authors have no competing interests.

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