Abstract

From the perspective of economics, this study applies the game theory to analyze the failure of China’s food safety supervision, clear the main objects of government regulation and regulatory measures, determine the necessary conditions for the government to implement effective supervision and make suggestions to improve our system of food safety supervision. Since the food is the necessity that human beings live on, food safety has become the common topic which shares all human beings’ concern. The food safety incidents which happened recent years have not only affected the health of people, but also had negative effects on economic development or even the social stability. Given this, the government has continuously intensified the supervision on food safety, implementing many policies like “Food Safety Project” and mandatory authentication plan of pollution-free food. In th National Video and Telephone Conference of Strengthening Food Safety on June 11 , 2015, Prime Minister Li Keqiang put forward that food safety concerned everyone’s physical health and life safety and it was the aspiration of the broad masses that could eat hearty and safe food, which was also the basic demand of building well-off society in an all-around way. On this background, this study began from the game analysis of government and food enterprises, based on Game theory, Stakeholder theory and so on, to build the game model of government and food enterprises and to analyze when faced with food safety supervision, the two parties would take what measures to obtain the maximum effect. At last, the paper proposed some suggestions for policies on reforming food safety supervision system.

Keywords:

Food enterprises, food safety supervision, game model, government, stakeholder,

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Competing interests

The authors have no competing interests.

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