Research Article | OPEN ACCESS
Capability Coordination in Agricultural Products Logistics Service Supply Chain with Revenue-sharing Contract
1Meiling He, 2Qifan Hu and 1Xiaohui Wu
1School of Automotive and Traffic Engineering, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
2College of Business Administration, Nanchang Institute of Technology, Nanchang 330099, China
Advance Journal of Food Science and Technology 2015 7:467-471
Received: August ‎31, ‎2014 | Accepted: September ‎20, ‎2014 | Published: June 20, 2015
Abstract
To solve the capability coordination in logistics service based on the agricultural products industry, a two-stage agricultural products Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC) was established with one agricultural products logistics service integrator and one functional logistics service provider. Based on the non-storage property of logistics service capability, the revenue-sharing contract model was built under the uncertain demand. The optimal logistics capability order quantity and the revenue-sharing coefficient were calculated when the agricultural products LSSC achieved coordination. Revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the agricultural products LSSC effectively compared with no contract. A numerical simulation was taken by MATLAB 7.0. The change of purchase price has no influence on the optimal logistics capability order quantity and the expected profit of agricultural products LSSC. It achieves a redistribution of members’ profits. With the increases of penalty cost, the optimal logistics capability order quantity and the expected profit of provider increase, while the expected profit of integrator and agricultural products LSSC decrease.
Keywords:
Agricultural products, capability coordination, logistics service supply chain, revenue-sharing contract,
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Competing interests
The authors have no competing interests.
Open Access Policy
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Copyright
The authors have no competing interests.
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ISSN (Online): 2042-4876
ISSN (Print): 2042-4868 |
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