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2011 (Vol. 3, Issue: 3)
Article Information:

Reduced Population Viscosity in Spatially Disordered, Triple Strategy Prisonerís Dilemma Games

K.A. Pimbblet
Corresponding Author:  Kevin Pimbblet 

Key words:  Emergent behaviour, game theory, population dynamics, , , ,
Vol. 3 , (3): 177-122
Submitted Accepted Published
2011 July, 20 2011 September, 07 2011 September, 25

Altruism in selfish groups of individuals has been explained using game theory. In this work, cooperation within a spatial evolutionary prisonerís dilemma game is studied with three strategies: cooperation, defection or Tit-for-Tat. By imposing the condition of a site diluted lattice and relaxing the condition of strong population viscosity, the emergence of cooperating and defecting island universes is observed. Under a softer condition of movement such that players may move to a lattice site of at least equal payoff we find that these defecting islands become inherently unstable and dissociate to invade the rest of the system. This subsequently leads to a re-emergence of cooperation in the entire system as the Tit-for-Tat strategies knockout any rampant unconditional defection strategies. These results are interpreted suggestively in the context of biology and sociology.
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  Cite this Reference:
K.A. Pimbblet, 2011. Reduced Population Viscosity in Spatially Disordered, Triple Strategy Prisonerís Dilemma Games.  Research Journal of Mathematics and Statistics, 3(3): 177-122.
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ISSN (Online):  2040-7505
ISSN (Print):   2042-2024
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