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Abstract
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Article Information:
Reduced Population Viscosity in Spatially Disordered, Triple Strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
K.A. Pimbblet
Corresponding Author: Kevin Pimbblet
Submitted: 2011 July, 20
Accepted: 2011 September, 07
Published: 2011 September, 25 |
Abstract:
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Altruism in selfish groups of individuals has been explained using game theory. In this work,
cooperation within a spatial evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game is studied with three strategies: cooperation,
defection or Tit-for-Tat. By imposing the condition of a site diluted lattice and relaxing the condition of strong
population viscosity, the emergence of cooperating and defecting island universes is observed. Under a softer
condition of movement such that players may move to a lattice site of at least equal payoff we find that these
defecting islands become inherently unstable and dissociate to invade the rest of the system. This subsequently
leads to a re-emergence of cooperation in the entire system as the Tit-for-Tat strategies knockout any rampant
unconditional defection strategies. These results are interpreted suggestively in the context of biology and
sociology.
Key words: Emergent behaviour, game theory, population dynamics, , , ,
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Abstract
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Cite this Reference:
K.A. Pimbblet, . Reduced Population Viscosity in Spatially Disordered, Triple Strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. Research Journal of Mathematics and Statistics, (3): 177-122.
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ISSN (Online): 2040-7505
ISSN (Print): 2042-2024 |
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