Research Article | OPEN ACCESS
Buyback Contract Coordinating Supply Chain Incorporated Risk Aversion
1Guangxing, 1Xin Deng, 1Yanhong Qin and 2Qing Wu
1Department of Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
2Department of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and
Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
Research Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology 2013 5:1744-1749
Received: July 31, 2012 | Accepted: September 03, 2012 | Published: February 11, 2013
Abstract
This research studies the buyback contract of a supply chain system composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. The buyback contract is divided into two cases, the credit for all unsold goods and the credit for a partial return of goods, which are theoretically analyzed and simulated numerically respectively. The results show that when the retailer is risk averse, the supply chain system is able to achieve coordination. The buyback price is an increasing function of and the buyback ratio is also an increasing function of, while the wholesale price is a decreasing function of the risk aversion.
Keywords:
Buyback contract, risk aversion, supply chain coordination,
Competing interests
The authors have no competing interests.
Open Access Policy
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Copyright
The authors have no competing interests.
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ISSN (Online): 2040-7467
ISSN (Print): 2040-7459 |
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